Flight 227: How a 1965 plane crash in Salt Lake City shaped U.S. aviation

SALT LAKE CITY — On Nov. 11, 1965, a United Airlines plane crashed during an attempted landing at the then-Salt Lake City Municipal Airport, killing over half of its traveling passengers.

On that day, a Boeing 727, operating as Flight 227, departed from the LaGuardia Airport in Queens, New York, to its final destination of the San Francisco International Airport.

According to the 1966 accident report by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Flight 227 was scheduled to have several intermediate stops, including at the Denver-Stapleton International Airport.

At 4:54 p.m.. Flight 227 left Denver for its next stop in Salt Lake City. About an hour later, Flight 227 crashed just 335 feet short of the runway of the airport, skidded across the ground, and combusted.

“I was about a mile away and there were flames,” said Norm Nelson, a KSL TV photographer during the newscast. “The fuel tanks in the wings undoubtedly had been ruptured, and shot down the runway, and finally came to a stop, probably about 8 or 900 yards further on. Then the flames really broke out, and I could see the people leaping out of the aircraft silhouetted against the flames.”

Authorities at the time reported that 41 of the 85 passengers died in the crash, with two more dying several days after the crash. All six crew members were hurt, but survived.

One passenger, Fred Sorensen of Salt Lake City, told KSL TV had no idea that the plane was having difficulties or was about to crash on the runway. It wasn’t until the landing that he knew something was wrong.

“As soon as we touched down … we touched down harder than I had normally experienced,” Sorensen said while in the hospital shortly after the crash. “And it was immediately after this that there was, a flame in the right rear section, over my right rear shoulder.”

Sorensen said the interior lights turned off, and that’s when other passengers started to panic as smoke began to fill the aircraft.

“Next thing I remember, I was out on the wing, and then I rolled off the wing and down onto the ground, and away from the aircraft. And there were several other people around and some badly injured,” Sorensen said.

The board said in its accident report that the 41 killed were “overcome by dense smoke, intense heat, and flames, or a combination of these factors, before they were able to escape. There were no traumatic injuries that would preclude their escape.”

The captain’s history of training

On June 7, 1966, the Civil Aeronautics Board released its accident report on the crash, revealing that pilot error had caused the devastating incident. It was determined that the pilot, 47-year-old Captain Gale C. Kehmeier, had a lack of training in flying jet aircraft.

According to the board, Kehmeier failed his Ground School phase of training, failing his oral exam “completely,” and had to undergo additional training for three weeks in November 1960. While he eventually passed the oral exam, Kehmeier continued to struggle with flight training to the point that his training was terminated.

One of Kehmeier’s training instructors said at the time that “a review of Captain Kehmeier’s record still indicates unsatisfactory performance in the areas of command, judgment, Standard Operating Procedures, landing technique, and smoothness and coordination.”

In February 1961, Kehmeier was removed from the jet training program, and he returned to flying other aircraft, where he was rated “average to above average,” according to the report.

A year later, Kehmeier re-entered the jet training program, but continued to struggle throughout the year. One of the instructors told the board that “it was necessary to repeat several items to achieve a satisfactory grade” for Kehmeier.

According to the report, Kehmeier did improve his flight skills in 1963 with an evaluation stating he has “done a creditable job during (the) period.” However, on Jan. 2, 1964, Kehmeier failed to pass an instrument proficiency check. Two days later, he did pass on a second attempt.

In January 1965, Kehmeier began training to fly the Boeing 727. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector told the board that during one of the flights, Kehmeier’s “overall check ride was a littlebelow average.”

“The main outstanding thing in my mind was that he could fly the airplane, but it was necessary several times to remind him to stay on altitude or airspeed,” the FFA inspector told the board.

In May, Kehmeier was ordered to wear corrective lenses while flying an airplane. According to the report, Kehmeier’s last proficiency check was on Sept. 8, and he was given an “above average” grade.

Poor judgement

During the interviews with Kehmeier and the rest of the crew, the CAB’s report determined that it was Kehmeier who prevented the first and second officers from performing the maneuvers that could have prevented the crash.

According to the report, the flight from Denver to Salt Lake City had no issues, and Flight 227’s crew was given clearance to land on the runway by Salt Lake City Air Traffic Control at 5:47 p.m.

The plane began to descend at a rate of over 2,300 feet per minute, which was three times the recommended descent rate of 6,800 feet per minute, according to the board.

The crew testified that the first officer began to apply more power to the plane to slow the descent, but Kehmeier “brushed his hand away and said, ‘Not yet.'”

“(Kehmeier) estimated that 15-20 seconds later, at approximately 5,500 feet m.s.¹, the first officer moved the thrust levers forward. When the engines did not respond, (Kehmeier) moved the thrust levers to the takeoff power position, and assumed control of the aircraft,” the report stated.

The first officer testified that full power was “applied approximately 5-10 seconds, but no more than 15 seconds prior to impact.” The second officer said that Kehmeier “applied about half throttle movement 7-8 seconds” before the crash.

According to the report, neither the weather nor the aircraft’s equipment caused any significant anomalies that would have contributed to the crash.

The board ultimately concluded that it was Kehmeier’s judgment of landing the plane that resulted in the crash.

“It is believed that the captain’s estimate of full power application 30 seconds prior to impact is in error,” the report stated. “If the thrust levers had been moved to the takeoff power positionthat early in the approach, the excess thrust would have been reflected in increased airspeed and/or decreased rate of descent.”

The board also cited Kehmeier’s training history, saying that he had a “pattern of below average judgment, as well as a tendency to deviate from standard operating procedures and practices.”

‘This was a survivable accident’

However, the board determined that it wasn’t the impact of the crash that caused 43 people to lose their lives, but the fire and the crew’s inability to help them to the exits.

“The impact of the crash did not produce any traumatic injuries, which would have precluded the escape of every passenger,” the report stated. “On the contrary, it was the speed with which the passengers progressed toward the exits that prevented the stewardess from reaching her assigned duty station for evacuation.”

Along with the exit issue, the broken fuel lines, combined with the sparks of the crash, caused the fire and prevented nearly half of the passengers from escaping.

“This was a survivable accident,” the report stated. “There were 91 persons aboard the aircraft and 50 were successful in evacuating … The remaining 41 occupants were overcome by dense smoke, intense heat, and flames, or a combination of these factors, before they were able to escape.”

Changes to safety

Following the crash, the FAA implemented several changes, including enhanced training for pilots and safety procedures.

According to the FAA’s website, rule changes required that flexible fuel lines in the plane could withstand a crash of this magnitude, so a fire doesn’t start after the crash

The FAA also required that flight attendants be stationed at emergency exits for takeoff and landings.

“Had all the flight attendants been properly situated and improved assist space been available to access the overwing exits, the passenger evacuation may have progressed more rapidly, resulting in fewer fatalities,” the FAA said on its Flight 277 post-mortem report.

According to the CAB’s report, none of the three pilots had sufficient hours of flight experience in a Boeing 727 and were inexperienced with the airplane’s equipment.

While Kehmeier had 334 hours in the Boeing 727, he had only begun training in it that year. The first officer had only 84 hours and the second officer had 166 hours.

In March 1966, the FAA increased the minimum flight hours requirement for a plane and the number of types of landings required for pilots.

Even though Flight 277 didn’t have a direct impact on the development of Crew Resource Management for aviation, it was one of the many high-profile crashes that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, which prompted CRM to be implemented.

CRM provided co-pilots with the training and authority to challenge a captain’s orders during a period when the cockpit hierarchy was blamed for several other crashes, such as the 1977 incident involving two Boeing 747s that crashed on the runway of Los Rodeos Airport in Spain.

This article was published by KSLTV5